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One hallmark of gambling disorder (GD) is the observation that gamblers have problems
stopping their gambling behavior once it is initiated. On a neuropsychological level, it has
been hypothesized that this is the result of a cognitive inflexibility.The present study inves-
tigated cognitive inflexibility in patients with GD using a task involving cognitive inflexibility
with a reward element (i.e., reversal learning) and a task measuring general cognitive inflex-
ibility without such a component (i.e., response perseveration). For this purpose, scores
of a reward-based reversal learning task (probabilistic reversal learning task) and the Wis-
consin card sorting task were compared between a group of treatment seeking patients
with GD and a gender and age matched control group. The results show that pathological
gamblers have impaired performance on the neurocognitive task measuring reward-based
cognitive inflexibility. However, no difference between the groups is observed regarding
non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility. This suggests that cognitive inflexibility in GD is
the result of an aberrant reward-based learning, and not based on a more general problem
with cognitive flexibility. The pattern of observed problems is suggestive of a dysfunction
of the orbitofrontal cortex, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and the ventral regions of
the striatum in gamblers. Relevance for the neurocognition of problematic gambling is
discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
A gambling disorder (GD) is characterized by a lack of self-
regulation (Goldstein et al., 2001; APA, 2013). Patients suffering
from this disorder are not able to inhibit their urge to gamble, and
are unable to shift their behavior (Goudriaan et al., 2008). Because
of the similarities between GD and substance use disorders it is
now generally seen as a non-substance related addictive disorder
(APA, 2013). Further, there is clear connection between GD and
obsessive compulsive disorder (Blaszczynski, 1999). A core feature
of these both disorders is the inability to stop repetitive detrimental
behavior.
One specific process related to the lack of self-regulation sug-
gested to underlie GD is cognitive inflexibility associated with
reward learning. More specifically, we refer to a tendency to hold
on to behavior that has been profitable before, but no longer leads
to gain (Klanker et al., 2013). In patients with GD, this reward-
based cognitive inflexibility presumably can be observed as some
kind of continuous gambling even in the face of increasing losses.
Reward-based cognitive inflexibility can be studied using the prin-
ciples of reversal learning, which is dependent on the capacity
to perform flexible behavior when stimulus-reward contingencies
alter (Clark et al., 2004; Franken et al., 2008). For example, in a
study using a reversal learning task, GD-patients performed worse
than healthy controls (de Ruiter et al., 2008). Reward-based cogni-
tive inflexibility, i.e., reversal learning, has been associated with the
orbitofrontal cortex (Klanker et al., 2013), the ventral prefrontal
cortex (Clark et al., 2004), the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (de
Ruiter et al., 2008) and is facilitated by dopaminergic activity in
the ventral regions of the striatum (Clark et al., 2004; Klanker
et al., 2013). The concept of reward-based cognitive inflexibility
is also closely related to the concept of reward sensitivity (Boog
et al., 2013) and the concept of impaired decision making under
conflicting contingencies (Goudriaan et al., 2008).
Another feature related to the lack of self-regulation is arguably
a more general, non-reward-based, cognitive inflexibility seen in
GDs. This form of cognitive inflexibility is based on the func-
tioning of different regions of the prefrontal cortex and the basal
ganglia (Monchi et al., 2001): the mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex, a cortical basal ganglia loop, the posterior prefrontal cortex,
and the putamen. Klanker et al. (2013) stress the importance of
the lateral prefrontal cortex in this form of cognitive inflexibil-
ity. Several studies show that GD-patients have non-reward-based
cognitive inflexibility and suffer from perseveration, mainly stud-
ied by using the Wisconsin card sorting task (WCST; Rugle and
Melamed, 1993; Regard et al., 2003; Goudriaan et al., 2006; Odlaug
et al., 2011). Contradictory findings are, however, reported by
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 569 | 1
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Boog et al. Cognitive inflexibility in gamblers
Cavedini et al. (2002). They found no differences between healthy
controls and GD-patients on the WCST and the Weigl’s sorting
test, another instrument to test cognitive flexibility. In a later study,
Brand et al. (2005) found no deviations in non-reward-based
cognitive flexibility in GD as well.
Cognitive inflexibility with and without reward in GD are
believed to be independent of each other (Cavedini et al., 2002).
This idea is further supported by findings in substance dependent
individuals (Bechara and Damasio, 2002). Cavedini et al. (2002)
excluded a possible interference of non-reward-based cognitive
inflexibility in abnormal decision making (i.e., reward-based cog-
nitive inflexibility) in the Iowa gambling task. In this task, subjects
have to choose between possible short-term high gains, resulting
in eventual losses, or short-term smaller gains, resulting in overall
gain in the long run. In contrast, Brand et al. (2005), however,
suggested that there is a relationship between cognitive inflexibil-
ity with and without reward in GD. They used the modified card
sorting test to investigate non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility.
The game of dice task was applied to measure cognitive inflexibil-
ity with reward, a test in which the rules regarding gains and losses
are explicit, contrary to the frequently used Iowa gambling task
(in which these rules are implicit). In other words, in the game of
dice task subjects receive explicit instructions on their chances of
winning and losing. Brand and colleagues found that GD was asso-
ciated with cognitive inflexibility with reward, but not with inflex-
ibility without reward. Importantly, they found a relationship
between cognitive inflexibility with and without reward in GD.
In the present study, the relationship between cognitive inflex-
ibility with and without reward in GD was further investigated. It
remains unclear whether basic cognitive inflexibility might play a
role in cognitive flexibility that is based on rewards. The present
study intended to clarify the nature of the presumed relationship
between GD, reward-based cognitive inflexibility and non-reward-
based cognitive inflexibility. Possibly, the difficulties with stopping
detrimental behavior observed in GD is more a general prob-
lem of cognitive flexibility (i.e., behavioral perseveration as seen
in obsessive compulsive disorders), and not only a reward-based
decision making problem. It was hypothesized that GD-patients
have higher levels of cognitive inflexibility without reward, that
GD-patients are more cognitive inflexible with reward and that
cognitive inflexibility with and without reward are not related.
Further, the relationships between self-reported symptoms related
to cognitive inflexibility (i.e., obsessive compulsive disorder symp-
toms), psychological distress, and cognitive inflexibility with and
without reward were studied. This was done in order to find out
if cognitive inflexibility was related to OCD-symptoms and psy-
chological distress and to possibly obtain insight in which form of
cognitive inflexibility is more related to and more relevant for the
phenotypical manifestations of GD. Lastly, we studied the associ-
ation between the cognitive inflexibility with and without reward
in both GD and controls.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-eight individuals (male and female) participated in this
study: 19 patients diagnosed with GD and 19 healthy controls.
The GD-group consisted of outpatients of a large urban mental
Table 1 | Characteristics of subjects.
GD-group Healthy controls
Gender 14 Males, 5 females 16 Males, 3 females
Age M=42.1 M=38.8
SD=13.35 SD=8.0
Level of education 1=26.3% 1=42.1%
2=52.6% 2=52.6%
3=15.8% 3=0%
4=5.3% 4=5.3%
Years of education M=13.47 M=15.11
SD=4.0 SD=2.47
Level of education: 1=high, 2= intermediate, 3= low, 4=no education.
M, mean; SD, standard deviation.
health care facility (Bouman Mental Health Care, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands). The groups were matched regarding to gender and
age. Characteristics of the two groups are presented in Table 1. GD-
patients suffering from severe concomitant psychiatric disorders
such as psychotic disorders, bipolar disorders, autism spectrum
disorders, and neuropsychiatric disorders (as assessed by clini-
cians) and suffering from color blindness were not included. The
healthy controls did not suffer from any psychiatric disorders or
color blindness.
PROCEDURE
Individuals who were included in the GD-group were all members
of a standard group therapy for GD. Potential participants were
informed about the procedure and when they were willing to take
part, they signed an informed consent form. Matched controls
were selected via convenience sampling. The study was approved
by the Ethics Commission of the Reinier van Arkel Groep. After
participants agreed to participate in the study, the behavioral tests
were administered, questionnaires were filled out and personal
information was acquired. The data collection took place in the
treatment facility.
INSTRUMENTS
The probabilistic reversal learning task (PRLT) was used as a mea-
sure of cognitive inflexibility (Clark et al., 2004; Franken et al.,
2008). The PRLT measures reward-based response perseveration.
In this study, we used the version of the PRLT as described by
Franken et al. (2008). During 100 trials, subjects had to choose
between two stimuli (S+ and S−, easily discernable geometrical
figures), presented on a computer screen. The S+ (advantageous)
stimulus had the following properties: a reward–punishment ratio
of 70:30, a reward range of 80–250 points, and a punishment
range of 10–60 points. For the S− (disadvantageous) stimulus
the reward–punishment ratio was 40:60, the reward range 30–60
points, and the punishment range 250–600 points. The contin-
uous choice of S+ lead to overall gain, the continuous choice of
S− resulted in overall loss. At onset, subjects did not know which
geometrical figure resulted in overall gain and which in overall
loss. They were supposed to learn this by trial and error. A reversal
took place after five correct (S+) choices. Then the geometrical
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figure leading to the advantageous outcome became the geometri-
cal figure leading to the disadvantageous outcome and vice versa.
The total number of reversals (i.e., the capacity to change strategy)
was the outcome variable of interest (PRLT reversals).
The WCST (Heaton, 1981) was used to investigate a more gen-
eral, non-reward-based, cognitive inflexibility, which is reflected
in the number of response perseverations (Goudriaan et al.,
2006). In this test, subjects have to sort cards in such a way that
they match one of four stimulus cards, according to a concept
that is unknown to the subject (form, color, or number). Feed-
back is provided regarding the correctness of the response. After
10 consecutive correct responses the sorting principle changes
and the subject has to change strategy. We used percentage
of perseverative responses as variable in our analyses (WCST
perseverations).
The brief symptom inventory (Derogatis and Melisaratos,
1983) is a self-report measure, derived from the SCL-90-R (Dero-
gatis et al., 1976). It is a brief psychological symptom scale. The
Dutch version of the BSI has solid validity and reliability (De Beurs
and Zitman, 2005), with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.96. Although the
BSI comprises nine subscales, the total score was used as index of
current distress in this study.
The Padua inventory (PI; Sanavio, 1988) is an obsessive com-
pulsive disorder symptom questionnaire. In a sample of Dutch
subjects, the validity and reliability of the PI were satisfactory
(van Oppen, 1992), with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94. In the
present study, the Padua Inventory-Revised (PI-R) was used (Van
Oppen et al., 1995; Anholt et al., 2009). It has five subscales:
impulses, washing, checking, rumination, and precision. Further,
it yields a total score, indicating severity of OCD-symptoms.
Some evidence exists for the construct validity of the PI-R.
(Van Oppen et al., 1995).
The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur and Blu-
men, 1987; Stinchfield, 2002) is a short screening instrument for
pathological gambling, based on DSM criteria. It has adequate psy-
chometric qualities (Lesieur and Blumen, 1987), with a Cronbach’s
alpha of 0.97. In the present study, a Dutch version of the SOGS
was used (Goudriaan, 2013). The SOGS was used as a measure of
severity of GD.
DATA ANALYSIS
Analyses were conducted to investigate possible differences
between GD-patients and controls regarding age, education,
and gender. Education was operationalized as level of educa-
tion and years of education. Level of education was divided
in four categories: high (college/university), intermediate (high
school), low (junior high school), and no secondary education.
An independent-samples t -test was used to investigate age differ-
ences and years of education, a Fisher’s exact test was used for
gender (because both variables in this analysis were categorical,
and because of small sample size). A Mann–Whitney U -test was
executed to compare the two groups regarding level of educa-
tion, because level of education is an ordinal variable. Further,
independent-samples t -tests were used to compare the group
of GD-patients with normal controls regarding scores on PRLT,
WCST, PI-R, and BSI. To compare both groups regarding scores
on the SOGS, a Mann–Whitney U -test was employed, because
of non-normality of the distribution of the values of this vari-
able. In order to study relationships between BSI, PI-R, PRLT,
and WCST correlations between these variables were determined.
These correlations were computed within the GD-group, in the
control group and in the total group (GD-patients and healthy
controls together). All tests were done two-tailed with an alpha
level of 0.05.
RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHICS
An independent-samples t -test was conducted to compare the
age of patients with GD and controls. No significant difference
was found in age between GD-patients (M= 42.05, SD= 13.35)
and controls (M= 38.79, SD= 7.79): t (29.39)= 0.92, p= 0.37.
Another independent-samples t -test was conducted to find out
if the two groups differed regarding years of education. No
significant difference was found in years of education between
GD-patients (M= 13.47, SD= 4.01) and controls (M= 15.11,
SD= 2.47): t (36)=−1.51, p= 0.14 (two-tailed). A significant dif-
ference between level of education of GD-patients and controls
was, however, found (p= 0.025) using a Mann–Whitney U -test.
Of the patients with GD, 26.3% had a low educational level versus
0% of the controls; 42.1% of the controls had a high educa-
tional level versus 15.8% in the control group. The control group
had a higher level of education. For gender, Fisher’s exact test
was employed. No significant differences in gender were found
(p= 0.69).
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GROUPS REGARDING REWARD-BASED
COGNITIVE INFLEXIBILITY, NON-REWARD-BASED COGNITIVE
INFLEXIBILITY, SEVERITY OF OCD-SYMPTOMS, PSYCHOLOGICAL
DISTRESS, AND SEVERITY OF GD
Mean scores (SD) of all five measures (PRLT reversals, WCST per-
severations, BSI, PI-R, and SOGS) are displayed in Table 2. To
find out if level of education was a possible confounder, Spearman
rank order correlations between level of education and the several
dependent variables were calculated as a pre-test. No significant
correlations were observed (correlation between educational level
and WCST perseveration was 0.14, and between education and
PRLT reversals was−0.02).
Independent-samples t -tests (PI-R, BSI, PRLT reversals, and
WCST perseverations) and a Mann–Whitney U -test (SOGS) were
conducted to compare the GD-group and the control group.
As expected, GD-patients reported significantly higher scores
on the SOGS (p< 0.001) than controls. Also, GD-patients had
higher scores on the PI-R total score [t (26.32)= 2.90, p= 0.01].
Table 2 | Mean scores (SDs) of GD-patients, healthy controls, and total
group on PRLT reversals,WCST perseverations, BSI, PI-R, and SOGS.
GD-group Healthy controls Total group
PRLT reversals 4.1 (2.2) 5.9 (2.7) 5.0 (2.6)
WCST perseverations 18.9 (11.4) 12.5 (5.9) 15.7 (9.5)
BSI 1.1 (1.1) 0.14 (0.12) 0.6 (0.9)
PI-R 36.1 (23.2) 18.9 (11.5) 27.5 (20.1)
SOGS 8.3 (3.4) 0.21 (0.71) 4.2 (4.7)
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On only two subscales of PI, patients with GD obtained sig-
nificantly higher scores (rumination and precision). The two
groups also differed regarding the BSI [t (18.48)= 3.76, p= 0.001],
GD-patients obtaining higher scores. Further, on the PRLT, GD-
patients reached a lower number of reversals [t (36)=−2.39,
p= 0.022]. No significant difference was found between the two
groups regarding percentage of perseverative responses in the
WCST [t (36)= 1.07, p= 0.29].
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REWARD-BASED COGNITIVE INFLEXIBILITY,
NON-REWARD-BASED COGNITIVE INFLEXIBILITY, PSYCHOLOGICAL
DISTRESS, AND SEVERITY OF OCD-SYMPTOMS
Inspection of scatterplots regarding the respective relationships
between the BSI, PI-R, WCST perseverations, and PRLT reversals,
neither revealed any outliers nor deviations from normality.
Correlations were computed between PI-R, BSI, PRLT reversals,
and WCST perseverations in the GD-group, the control group and
the total group. Results can be found in Tables 3–5. In GD-patients,
significant correlations were found between PRLT reversals and
BSI (higher number of reversals associated with lower BSI-scores),
and between BSI and PI-R (higher BSI-scores co-occur with higher
PI-R-scores). The correlation between PRLT reversals and PI-
R only approached significance. More reversals were linked to
lower PI-R-scores. In the control group, no significant correla-
tions appeared. In the total group, significant correlations were
found between PRLT reversals and BSI (more reversals associ-
ated with lower BSI-scores), between PRLT reversals and PI-R
(more reversals associated with lower PI-R-scores), and between
BSI and PI-R (higher BSI-scores co-occurred with higher scores
on PI-R).
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the nature of the presumed rela-
tionship between GD and cognitive inflexibility. Significant dif-
ferences were found between a group of patients suffering from
GD and healthy controls (matched regarding age and gender).
GD-patients reported higher levels of severity of gambling, higher
levels of psychological distress, and more obsessive compulsive
symptoms. Further, they displayed more reward-based cognitive
inflexibility. No evidence was found that GD was related to non-
reward-based cognitive inflexibility, i.e., perseveration. In the GD-
group, reward-based and non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility
were not related. Reward-based cognitive inflexibility was signif-
icantly related to level of psychological distress; more inflexible
GD-patients reporting more symptoms. A near-significant corre-
lation was found between reward-based cognitive inflexibility and
OCD-symptoms. Non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility was
not related to level of psychological distress or OCD-symptoms.
In the control group,no relationship was found between the two
forms of cognitive inflexibility, and between cognitive inflexibility
and symptoms. In the total group, however, significant relation-
ships were found between reward-based cognitive inflexibility on
one side and psychological distress and OCD-symptoms on the
other. Non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility was not related to
level of psychological distress or OCD-symptoms. Once again,
reward-based and non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility were
not related.
Table 3 | Correlations between several variables in the GD-group.
PRLT WCST PI-R BSI
reversals perseverations
PRLT reversals −0.21 −0.45a −0.52b
WCST perseverations −0.02 0.14
PI-R 0.78c
BSI
ap=0.054.
bCorrelation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
cCorrelation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Table 4 | Correlations between several variables in the control group.
PRLT WCST PI-R BSI
reversals perseverations
PRLT reversals −0.19 −0.07 0.01
WCST perseverations −0.25 0.05
PI-R 0.40
BSI
Table 5 | Correlations between several variables in the total group (GD
and control).
PRLT WCST PI-R BSI
reversals perseverations
PRLT reversals −0.24 −0.39a −0.45b
WCST perseverations 0.01 0.19
PI-R 0.78b
BSI
aCorrelation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
bCorrelation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).
The findings in the present study suggest that reward-based
cognitive inflexibility characterizes GD-patients in contrast to
non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility. GD-patients, in other
words, do not seem to have problems with general flexibility in
strategy and behavior, but do have difficulties with altering a
response that is rewarded before, but no longer is (i.e., a dysfunc-
tional focus on rewards). This is line with findings of several studies
that suggest that GD is intertwined with reward-based cognitive
inflexibility (Cavedini et al., 2002; Brand et al., 2005; de Ruiter
et al., 2008). The idea that GD is not related to general flexibility
is supported by two studies (Cavedini et al., 2002; Brand et al.,
2005), but is contradicted by results from other studies (Rugle
and Melamed, 1993; Regard et al., 2003; Goudriaan et al., 2006;
Odlaug et al., 2011). Also, the present study found indications that
reward-based and non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility are not
related in GD. Therefore, it seems that the reward-based cognitive
inflexibility observed in GD is not the result of a more general,
non-reward-based tendency to perseverate. The results of differ-
ent studies support these findings (Bechara and Damasio, 2002;
Cavedini et al., 2002). Brand et al. (2005), however, suggest that
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non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility in itself is not a character-
istic of GD [which is supported by the findings of Cavedini et al.
(2002)], but plays a role in reward-based cognitive inflexibility,
when the rules about winning and losing are explicit.
The present study gives preliminary evidence for the idea that
reward-based cognitive inflexibility is a more central feature of GD
than non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility. This conception is
further supported by the finding that in the GD-group reward-
based inflexibility was related to level of psychological distress
and nearly significantly related to level of OCD-symptoms; in the
total group reward-based cognitive inflexibility was related to psy-
chological distress and OCD-symptoms. In other words, subjects
who were inflexible when rewards were at stake, were more obses-
sive and compulsive and reported lower levels of psychological
well-being. Cognitive inflexibility without reward was not related
to OCD-symptoms and psychological distress. This is another
indication that GD might be more a problem of reward-based
inflexibility than of a general tendency to perseverate. This stresses
the importance of possible dysfunctioning of the orbitofrontal
cortex, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and the ventral regions
of the striatum in GD-patients (Clark et al., 2004; Klanker et al.,
2013).
Some limitations of this study should be mentioned. Firstly,
the size of the sample was relatively small. Further, the rules for
winning and losing in the PRLT are implicit. That leaves open the
possibility that non-reward-based cognitive inflexibility plays a
role in reward-based cognitive inflexibility (see Brand et al., 2005).
In this study, the relations between reward-based and non-
reward-based cognitive inflexibility and GD were investigated. In
the context of comparing non-reward-based and reward-based
cognitive inflexibility in GD, the paradigm of reversal learning
is used for the first time. It is likely that reward-based cognitive
inflexibility is a more central aspect of GD.
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